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THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND
APPEALS COURTS NOMINEES
Carl Tobias*
On May 9, President George W. Bush announced his first set of nominees for
the United States Courts of Appeals. With a White House ceremony which chief
executives traditionally reserve for United States Supreme Court designees, the
president introduced eleven individuals whom he proposed for vacancies on the
federal intermediate appellate courts. Submitting a package of appeals court
nominees might seem to be a relatively mundane exercise. However, the
developments that led to Bush's recommendations, the staging of this event, and the
candidates tendered actually reveal much about contemporary judicial selection,
which is a critical feature of constitutional governance. For example, the
determination that there should be a ceremony suggests the crucial symbolic and
practical importance the nascent Bush Administration assigns to filling empty
appellate court seats. The persons whom the president earlier considered but did
not nominate on May 9 are similarly instructive.
These propositions mean that the initial batch of Bush Administration nominees
for the appeals courts warrants analysis. This essay undertakes that effort. I first
examine the background of the May 9th announcement. The essay then evaluates
the process that the chief executive and his assistants used to nominate the
candidates, as well as the qualifications of the people chosen and those individuals
whom the president considered, yet decided against proposing. I next posit
numerous lessons that can be derived from assessing the method that the chief
executive and his staff employed to select the initial nominees and the persons
nominated. The essay concludes with several recommendations for the future
appointment of judges.
I. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SELECTION
The historical developments that preceded President Bush's May 9
announcement of the eleven nominees may appear to deserve somewhat limited
examination, partly because this background has received considerable treatment
elsewhere.' However, rather comprehensive exploration is advisable, as that type
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of analysis should inform appreciation of Bush Administration actions and modem
judicial appointments. This section emphasizes the controversial Senate rejection
of Circuit Judge Robert Bork for the Supreme Court in 1987 and applicable events
since this incident, because many phenomena which characterize recent judicial
selection can be traced to that confirmation dispute.
A. Selection in the Carter Administration
A small number of women and very few minorities served on the federal
appellate or district courts when President Jimmy Carter won election during 1976.2
He accorded the appointment of more female and minority judges a high priority
and implemented several initiatives to realize this goal. For instance, the chief
executive asked that senators search for, delineate, and recommend women and
minorities and establish district court nominating panels which would identify and
promote their candidacies, while he created the United States Circuit Judge
Nominating Commission to identify and foster selection of female and minority
appeals court judges.3 Approximately one-sixth of the judges whom Carter named
were women, and more than twenty percent were minorities.
B. Selection in the Reagan Administration
When Ronald Reagan became president in 1980, he asserted that his election
constituted a public mandate to move the judiciary in a politically conservative
direction.' The chief executive appointed numerous judges with these ideological
perspectives; however, he chose tiny numbers of female and minority attorneys.
Indeed, fewer than two percent of the judges whom the president selected were
African Americans.6
2 See Robert J. Lipshutz &Douglas B. Huron, Achievinga More Representative Federal
Judiciary, 62 JUDICATURE 483 (1979); Elliot.E. Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Raising It
Higher?: Affirmative Action and Judicial Selection During the Carter Administration, 1
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 270, 271 (1983).
' See, e.g., LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT
JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980);
ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSIONS: THEIR
MEMBERS, PROCEDURES, AND CANDIDATES (1981); Federal Judicial Selection: The
Problems and Achievements of Carter's Merit Plan, 62 JUDICATURE 463 (1979).
' See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and
Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 322, 325 (1989); Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal
Judicial Selection, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1261. For more discussion of the Carter
Administration, see GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 236-84.
5 See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BREN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE 60 (1988); Sheldon Goldman,
Reagan's Judicial Appointments at Mid-term: Shaping the Bench in His Own Image, 66
JUDICATURE 334, 347 (1983).
6 See Goldman, supra note 4, at 322, 325; Tobias, supra note 4, at 1269.
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Perhaps most important to the issues treated in this essay was Reagan's 1987
choice of Judge Bork to replace retiring U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., because the controversial battle which ensued over Bork's confirmation
substantially changed modem judicial selection, and the event's repercussions
continue.' The sharply-contested nomination, and attempted confirmation, of Judge
Bork help explain the increasingly partisan, contentious state of appointments
President Reagan's nomination of Judge Bork triggered a protracted, bitter
confirmation fight, in part because many observers perceived the Supreme Court to
be evenly divided along ideological lines.9 The chief executive and Judge Bork's
supporters contended that his service as solicitor general, as a member of the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and as a respected professor at Yale
Law School made Bork eminently qualified for the Supreme Court. The nominee's
opponents argued that his views on numerous important issues were outside the
mainstream of American jurisprudential thought. A majority of the American Bar
Association Standing Committee on the Judiciary rated Bork as qualified, but some
of the entity's members found him unqualified. 0 A broad range of interest groups
waged public relations campaigns for and against Bork's candidacy and intensively
lobbied senators. After contentious Judiciary Committee hearings and rancorous
floor debate, the Senate rejected Bork by a significant margin." Most senators who
voted against Bork, and some members of the public, believed that his perspectives
were too extreme. In contrast, senators who voted for the nominee and others in the
public found that Bork was an exceptional choice, that the Senate had rejected him
on ideological grounds, and that opponents had misrepresented the judge's record.
C. Selection in the Bush Administration
After George Bush won the 1988 election, he promised to honor President
Reagan's pledge by making the bench more conservative. Bush chose numerous
' See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE (1989); STEPHEN CARTER, THE
CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994).
' See GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 76-77; PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT:
CLARENCE THOMAS, ROBERT BORK, AND THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S NOMINATION BATrLES (1992).
9 See, e.g., BRONNER, supra note 7; CARTER, supra note 7; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at
71-73, 76-77, 125-26, 196-97, 219-21, 239-40; MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE
(1992).
"o See BRONNER, supra note 7, at 205; CARTER, supra note 7, at 163-64; GERHARDT,
supra note 1, at 73. See also infra note 33 and accompanying text.
11 See BRONNER, supra note 7, at 327; CARTER, supra note 7, at 124-25; GERHARDT,
supra note 1, at 183. For more discussion of the Reagan Administration, see GOLDMAN,
supra note 1, at 285-345; O'BRIEN, supra note 5, at 60-64.
2 See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76
JUDICATURE 282 (1993) [hereinafter Goldman, Final]; Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint
on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74 JUDICATURE 294 (1991); Tobias, supra note
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rather conservative members of the judiciary and comparatively few minorities,
although he did appoint a significant number of women.'3 Quite relevant to this
essay are many developments implicating judicial selection that seemingly derived
from the Bork confirmation fight. For example, certain dynamics similar to those
which attended the Bork controversy accompanied the divisive appointments
process that ensued when President George Bush nominated D.C. Circuit Judge
Clarence Thomas for the Supreme Court. 4 The nominee's advocates and
opponents, particularly from interest groups, proffered certain arguments analogous
to those presented during the dispute over Judge Bork. 5 Following tumultuous
hearings, which included charges against the nominee by Professor Anita Hill, the
Senate confirmed Thomas on a 52-48 vote.'6
President Bush, as well as Republican and Democratic senators, apparently
instituted efforts to increase cooperation injudicial selection after this controversial
fight. 7 For instance, Justice David Souter's confirmation proceeded rather
smoothly.'8 Nonetheless, when President Bush left the White House, there were
approximately 100 federal court vacancies.' 9 Democrats claimed that these
openings resulted from the chief executive's failure to nominate at a steady pace
individuals whom Democrats deemed acceptable.20 In contrast, Republicans
attributed the numerous empty seats to Democrats' inexpeditious consideration of
Bush Administration nominees.'
D. Selection in the Clinton Administration
When Bill Clinton captured the White House in 1992, some students of the
federal judicial appointments process claimed that he emphasized competence and
diversity and accorded political ideology less importance in appointing judges.2
4, at 1270-74.
' See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 4, at 1270-74.
4 See JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE
THOMAS (1994); TIMOTHY PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNrrz, CAPITOLGAMES (1997).
'5 See CARTER, supra note 7, at 137; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 238-41.
J6 Goldman, Final, supra note 12, at 283.
' See id.; Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV.
309, 314 (1996).
18 See CARTER, supra note 7, at 81-82, 162; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 73; Tobias,
supra note 4, at 1273.
19 VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1992). See also Sheldon Goldman & Elliot
Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term Judiciary: Picking Judges Under Fire, 82JUDICATURE265
(1999); Tobias, supra note 17, at 314.
20 See Goldman, Final, supra note 12; Tobias, supra note 4, at 1273; Carl Tobias, More
Women Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. REv. 477 (1991).
21 Id.
22 See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 19; Tobias, supra note 17. See also Joan
Biskupic, Clinton Given Historic Opportunity to Transform Judiciary, WASH. POST, Nov.
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The president chose very talented lawyers who increased the bench's gender, racial,
and political balance while naming unprecedented numbers of female and minority
judges.23
During President Clinton's first year in office,judicial confirmation progressed
somewhat slowly.24 However, in 1994 the chief executive worked closely with the
Democratically-controlled Senate, and this effort led to the approval of more than
100 judges. 25 After the Republican Party recaptured the Senate in 1994, the
processing of judicial nominees slowed considerably.26 Senator Orrin Hatch (R-
Utah), who became the Judiciary Committee Chair, promised to confirm nominees
who were in good health, competent, and understood the role of judges.27 He
pledged that the Committee would hold one hearing every month Congress was in
session and would consider one appeals court, and five district court, nominees
during each hearing.2"
Despite this promise, processing remained quite slow and the Senate approved
fewer than twenty judges in 1997, the initial year of Clinton's second term.29
Democrats claimed that the confirmation pace could be ascribed to delayed Senate
Judiciary Committee consideration and inexpeditious scheduling of floor debates
and votes.3 ' Republicans, for their part, asserted that Clinton submitted names
erratically and that an insufficient number of lawyers tendered were acceptable to
Republicans because, for example, the nominees might be "judicial activists.'"'"
Accordingly, during 1997 there were some 100 vacancies on the appeals and
district courts. 32 This situation prompted Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
19, 1996, at A19.
3 See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 19, at 276-77, 281-88; Tobias, supra note
1, at 839, 846.
24 See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges
to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254 (1997); Carl Tobias, Keeping the Covenant on the Federal
Courts, 47 SMU L. REV. 1861 (1994). See also Tobias, supra note 1, at 829-47.
2 See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78
JUDICATURE 276 (1995); Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on the Federal Bench, 32 HoUs.
L. REV. 137 (1995).
26 This was especially true in 1996, which was a presidential election year. See Goldman
& Slotnick, supra note 24; Tobias, supra note 1, at 836-39; Tobias, supra note 25.
27 See Goldman, supra note 25; Tobias, supra note 17, at 314-21; Neil A. Lewis, New
ChiefofJudiciary Panel May Find an Early Test With Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1994,
at A3 1.
29 Id.
29 See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 24, at 265-68; Carl Tobias, Fostering Balance
on the Federal Courts, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 935 (1998).
30 id.
31 Id.
32 VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1997). See also Goldman & Slotnick, supra
note 19, at 267; Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton
Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741 (1997).
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several national bar organizations to urge that the president and senators of both
political parties institute measures which would expedite appointments.33 These
remonstrations apparently had a tonic effect, because the Senate confirmed 60
judges in 1998. 3" However, the pace of selection subsequently slowed. During
1999, President Clinton's impeachment significantly delayed processing.3"
Moreover, confirmation of judicial nominees proceeded quite slowly in 2000, as
normally occurs during a presidential election year.36 Thus, when President Bush
was inaugurated in January 200 1, more than 100 vacancies, including nearly 30 on
the appeals courts, existed.37
II. CURRENT JUDICIAL SELECTION
In the 2000 presidential election, Governor Bush secured a narrow electoral
college victory and lost the popular vote. Moreover, the 2000 Congressional results
left the Republican Party with a razor-thin Senate majority and, therefore, control
of the Judiciary Committee that assumes major responsibility for the confirmation
process. The Bush Administration assembled a judicial selection team which
principally operated under the auspices of the White House Counsel's Office, in
part because its members do not require Senate confirmation.3" During March,
Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, announced that the administration
would not solicit ABA ratings of candidates' qualifications before their nomination,
a responsibility discharged by the Bar Association for a half-century.39 Although
" WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1997);
Letter from N. Lee Cooper, ABA President, et al. to President William Jefferson Clinton &
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (July 14, 1997), reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. S8046
(daily ed. July 24, 1997). See also Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26,
1997, at 37.
14 See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 19, at 266; Tobias, supra note 1, at 841-44; Carl
Tobias, Leaving a Legacy on the Federal Courts, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 315,325-27 (1999).
" Tobias, supra note 1, at 844-47. See generally MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL
IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2000);
RICHARD POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE (1999).
36 See Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84
JUDICATURE 228 (200 1); Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection at the Clinton Administration's End,
19 LAW & INEQ. 159 (2001).
" VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2000). See also Carl Tobias, Dear President
Bush, 67 Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2002); Nick Anderson, Democrats Look to Battles
After Ashcroft, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at A14.
38 See Thomas Edsall, White House Prepares Judicial Nominating Blitz, WASH. POST,
Apr. 25, 2001, at 29A; Neil A. Lewis, President Moves Quickly on Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2001, § 1, at 34.
9 Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Martha W. Barnett,
President, American Bar Association (Mar. 22, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/news/releases/2001/03/20010322-5.html. See also AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE ABA
STANDING COMMITEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS (1991);
[Vol. 1 0: 1
BUSH AND APPEALS COURT NOMINEES
the chief executive and his aides privately conducted much work, which culminated
in the May 9 announcement of eleven appellate court nominees, it is possible to
construct a rather reliable descriptive account from newspaper and other sources,
such as individuals who are familiar with the developments that transpired.
The judicial selection team, which included Gonzales, Tim Flanigan, the
Deputy White House Counsel, and other lawyers in this office, accorded the choice
of federal judges, especially for the appeals courts, a high priority." The team, in
conjunction with President Bush, articulated the administration's appointments
goals and developed effective procedures for securing those objectives. The chief
executive requested that possible nominees have great experience and intellect as
well as "appreciate the separation of powers and understand and believe in judicial
restraint."'" The office developed lists of candidates for each vacant seat primarily
by contacting: senators and additional political leaders from the regions affected;
organizations, such as the Federalist Society, with strong interests in judicial
selection; and judges, attorneys and others who might be familiar with the
professional qualifications or personal qualities of individuals under
consideration.4 Once the team narrowed the lists of potential nominees, it invited
those who remained to interview in Washington, D.C. Gonzales stated: "we ask
them questions about their philosophy ... how do they construe statutes, how do
they resolve disputes and what they believe is the appropriate role of judges,"
observing that President Bush agrees that the "role of judges should be fairly
limited."4
The team then selected finalists whom it recommended to the chief executive.
If the president concurred and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
"background check" was positive, the individual received nomination. During the
spring, various media accounts reported that the White House was considering the
possible nomination of many persons to the appeals courts.4 ' On May 9, the chief
executive nominated numerous people mentioned; however, he did not choose
Terry Carter, Squeeze Play: Bush Acts to Limit ABA Role in Screening Judicial
Nominations, A.B.A. J., May, 2001, at 18.
40 Edsall, supra note 38, at 29A.
4' See David Savage, Bush Picks 1 ]for Federal Bench, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at
Al; Deirdre Shesgreen, White House Begins Work on Filling Judgeships; Appointments
Could Transcend Tax Cuts as Bush's Legacy, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 4, 2001, at
A5.
42 See Amy Bach, Movin' on Up With the Federalist Society: How the Right Rears Its
Lawyers, THE NATION, Oct. 1, 2001, at 11; Terry Carter, The In Crowd, 87 A.B.A. J. 46
(Sept. 2001); Edsall, supra note 38, at 29A; Crystal Nix Hines, Young Liberal Law Group
is Expanding, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2001, at A17; Lewis, supra note 38, at 34.
4' Lewis, supra note 32. See also Thomas Edsall, Democrats Push Bush for Input on
Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2001, at A4; Amy Goldstein, Bush Will Nominate II U.S.
Judges, WASH. POST, May 9, 2001, at A1; supra note 41 and accompanying text; infra note
62 and accompanying text.
" See generally supra note 43 and accompanying text.
2001]1
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
several candidates whom the press reports discussed.45
President Bush nominated to the D.C. Circuit John Roberts, a former deputy
solicitor general and law clerk to Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Miguel Estrada, a
former assistant to the solicitor general and clerk to Justice Anthony Kennedy, and
the first Latino proposed for that court."' The chief executive recommended the
elevation to the Second Circuit of Barrington Parker, Jr., an African American
whom Clinton named to the Southern District of New York.47 The president chose
for the Fourth Circuit: Roger Gregory, an African American whom Clinton had
given a recess appointment; Terrence Boyle, chief judge of the Eastern District of
North Carolina and a former staffer for Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.); and Dennis
Shedd, a judge on the District of South Carolina and a one-time aide to Senator
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)." The chief executive nominated to the Fifth Circuit
Edith Brown Clement, who is presently ajudge in the Eastern District of Louisiana,
and Priscilla Owen, who is now a Texas Supreme Court justice.49 For the Sixth
Circuit the chief executive selected Jeffrey Sutton, who enjoys a national reputation
for litigating on behalf of states' rights, and Deborah Cook, an Ohio Supreme Court
justice.5" President Bush nominated to the Tenth Circuit Michael McConnell, a
former clerk to Justice William Brennan and a law professor at the University of
Utah.51 In short, the nominees included five current federal judges and two state
Supreme Courtjustices; two African Americans, one Latino and three women; and
four experienced Supreme Court advocates.
Several candidates who had received considerable press coverage as potential
nominees were conspicuously absent from the list of eleven.52 They included two
possibilities for the Ninth Circuit: Representative Christopher Cox (R-Cal.), an
influential member of Congress; and Carolyn Kuhl, a state court judge in Los
Angeles and former Justice Department lawyer in the Reagan Administration.53
Another was Peter Keisler, a former law clerk to Justice Kennedy and Judge Bork,
who was mentioned for possible nomination to the Fourth Circuit.54
45 Id.
46 See Savage, supra note 41; No Rush to Judges; George W. Bush's Nominations for
Circuit Court of Appeals Judges, THE NATION, June 4, 2001, at 4 (hereinafter No Rush to
Judges).
4 Goldstein, supra note 43, at Al.
48 No Rush to Judges, supra note 46, at 4.
49 Id.
5o Id.
5I Id.; Savage, supra note 41.
52 Savage, supra note 41.
53 See Neil A. Lewis, Bush to Nominate 11 to Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2001, at
A24; Savage, supra note 41. See also S.J. Calm, Cox Passes on Judicial Seat, L.A. TIMES,
May 26, 2001, at A1; Henry Weinstein, Rep. Cox and Jurist Carolyn Kuhl Called Likely
Nominees, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2001, at Al. For further discussion of Carolyn Kuhl's
nomination, see infra note 80.
14 Id. See also David L. Greene & Thomas Healy, Bush Sends Judge List to Senate,
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President Bush's remarks in announcing the eleven nominees suggest much
about the administration's views of federal judicial selection. The chief executive
first acknowledged the critical significance of the duty assigned to him." Bush
observed that a president assumes few responsibilities greater than nominating
federal judges and that the Constitution and the nation require this power's wise
exercise." Members ofthe bench serve for life in positions of substantial influence
and respect, while they are entrusted with the law's authority and majesty."
The chief executive then extolled the qualifications possessed by his nominees.
The president asserted that "all have sterling credentials and have met high
standards of legal training, temperament and judgment.""8 He further described the
nominees:
Four of them serve as United States district judges, all four confirmed
by unanimous votes. Two others are sitting judges on State supreme
courts. Four have served as law clerks in the Supreme Court of the
United States. One has served here as an Associate Counsel to the
President. One already holds the position for which I nominate him, by
recess appointment of President Clinton. 9
He characterized the nominees as "individuals of experience and character...
[who] come from diverse backgrounds and will bring a wide range of experience
to the bench."60 Bush claimed to have tendered the person's names fully confident
that they would "satisfy any test of... merit" while asserting that those selected
"command broad, bipartisan support.'
Bush next capitalized on this opportunity to outline his nomination criteria,
stating that the people chosen would be of the "highest caliber" and would "clearly
understand ... that the judge's role is to interpret the law, not to legislate from the
bench. 62 Bush contended that his nominees would "exercise not the will of men,
but the judgment of law" and would appreciate the difference, thereby enabling
them to defend constitutional rights, enforce statutes, and dispense justice. a
The president concluded by elaborating on the process employed and reflecting
BALT. SUN, May 10, 2001, at 1A; Neil A. Lewis, Washington Talk: Road to Federal Bench
Gets Bumpier in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, at A16.
55 PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ANNOUNCING NOMINATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY,
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. (May 9, 2001) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S REMARKS].
56 Id.
37 Id.
58 id.
59 id.
60 id.
61 id.
62 Id. See also supra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text.
63 PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, supra note 55.
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on the future. He stated that the administration had continued a constitutional
process, which implicates the federal government's three branches, partly because
it "sought and received advice from Senators of both parties."64 The chief executive
said that he forwarded the nominees in good faith, trusting the Senate also to
operate in good faith.6" The president admonished that the confirmation system had
recently been diverted to other ends, resulting in battles which bore little
relationship to the nominee's merits.' Bush characterized this activity as harmful
"for the Senate, for our courts [and] the country."67 He urged senators from each
political party to reject the past bitterness and provide fair hearings and prompt
votes for all nominees, returning "civility and dignity to the confirmation process."68
Bush reminded observers that there were more than 100 federal court vacancies and
that these openings cause "backlogs, frustration and delay of justice."69
11. LESSONS
Numerous lessons can be derived from evaluating the selection procedures
which ultimately led to President George W. Bush's nomination of the eleven
individuals for the federal appeals courts and from examining the qualifications of
the people designated. The system that culminated in the submission of these
nominees, the persons chosen, and individuals considered but not proposed
concomitantly yield instructive insights on contemporary federal judicial selection.
A. The Bush Administration
The process implemented and applied, the people nominated, and those
considered yet not forwarded inform understanding of the nascent Bush
Administration and its perspectives on judicial appointments. Numerous
phenomena suggest that the president and his staff who are responsible for
identifying candidates generally possess rather sophisticated appreciation of the
modem selection process. Perhaps most telling was the ability to assemble less than
four months after inauguration eleven highly competent appeals court nominees,
who are diverse in terms of race, gender and political views, and who, if confirmed,
would cause ten of the twelve regional circuits to have a majority of active
Republican appointees.70  Other factors manifest similarly sophisticated
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 id..
70 Insofar as judges reflect the views of appointing presidents, having a majority is critical
to the en banc process, which essentially has responsibility for the law of the circuit. See
Warren Richey, Federal Bench at a Tipping Point, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 9,
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comprehension of appointments. These are: the expeditious installation of an
experienced judicial selection team in the White House Counsel Office; the
devotion of substantial resources to the endeavor; the enunciation of clear goals and
the development of effective procedures to realize them; the establishment of
priorities; and the apparent amenability to capitalizing on the successes and failures
of past efforts through dependence on efficacious measures, such as consultation.
They also include a willingness to compromise by submitting Clinton appointees
and considering, but not nominating, several persons who provoked too much
controversy, while tendering a few quite conservative people.
The practices instituted and employed and the individuals chosen specifically
reveal much about the Bush Administration. They indicate that the chief executive
and those assistants who work on judicial selection understand the substantial
symbolic, practical and political importance of the federal judiciary as a general
matter, and the appeals courts in particular. For example, reliance on a White
House ceremony historically used to announce Supreme Court nominees when
introducing the eleven persons shows the great significance accorded by Bush and
his aides to appellate court selection and their appreciation of the critical roles
which the media and public opinion play.7' The process and the people chosen
indicate that the chief executive and White House personnel consider the regional
circuits essentially the courts of last resort in their areas because the Supreme Court
hears so few appeals." This phenomenon is accentuated by the perception that
appel late judges increasingly resolve highly controversial social policy issues, such
as those involving abortion, affirmative action, public school prayer and
federalism."
The procedures deployed and the nominees themselves concomitantly suggest
that the Bush Administration comprehends the political value ofjudicial selection.
These appointments enable the president to leave a legacy by naming judges who
will decide cases long after the chief executive has completed his service." The
process also provides a relatively cost-free means of cultivating conservative
2001, at 1; No Rush to Judges, supra note 46. See also Michael Solinine, Ideology and En
Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29 (1989).
" See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text. See also CARTER, supra note 7, at 13-
20, 25-31, 37-53, 166-69, 192-95; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 212-49.
72 See THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICEON APPEAL 17 (1994); Arthur D. Helliman,
The Shrunken Docket ofthe Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REv. 403 (1997); Neil A. Lewis,
Bush to Reveal First Judicial Choices Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at A17.
71 See DONALD SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS (2000); Susan B. Haire et al., The Voting Behavior of Clinton's Courts ofAppeals
Appointees, 84 JUDICATURE 274 (2001); Richey, supra note 47. But see Savage, supra note
70.
74 See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 100-01; Tobias, supra note 34; Warren Richey,
Bush Pleas for New Judges, But So Far It's Hardball, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May
11, 2001, at 2; Shesgreen, supra note 41.
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constituencies. For example, the president can solidify his political base when he
nominates people with those views; even if they are not confirmed, the chief
executive can claim that he attempted to appoint them.
B. Modern Selection
The practices which the Bush Administration implemented and employed and
the persons whom the chief executive chose also inform appreciation of
contemporary federal judicial selection while affording peculiarly salient insights
on the norms, rules and practices which accompany court appointments today.75
The procedures used and the nominees announced reaffirm the strength of
numerous longstanding traditions and confirm the existence and growth of several
modem ones.
One clear illustration of conventional understandings is the substantial power
to influence the process exercised both by the chief executive as well as the Senate
and individual senators, especially senators who represent the state in which judges
would sit.76 Presidential power finds expression in the confirmation presumption
that attends nomination and the choice of several quite conservative attorneys
among the eleven. These lawyers' inclusion concomitantly honors the tradition
that the chief executive may propose individuals whose political views ostensibly
resemble his, even as Bush evinced willingness to compromise on this issue by
tendering a few moderate nominees. 8 The Fourth Circuit most strikingly evidences
Senate power. The nominees, who are sitting district judges in North Carolina and
South Carolina, had been aides of the senior Republican senators from those states,
while Virginia's Republican senators publicly urged Bush to nominate Judge Roger
Gregory. 9 In comparison, the president withheld Peter Keisler's name for that
court, partly because the chief executive did not consult the Democratic senators
from Maryland where the opening arose.8" Judge Gregory shows how nominees can
be agents for themselves. The jurist had already served on the Fourth Circuit for
six months under a recess appointment from President Clinton. Moreover,
75 GERHARDT, supra note 1; GOLDMAN, supra note 1.
76 See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 135-79.
77 GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 81-134; supra notes 46, 62 and accompanying text; supra
notes 41-53.
78 GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 81.
71 See Jonathan Groner & Jonathan Ringel, Judicial Nominee Horsetrading Heats Up as
Confirmation Process Gets Weighed, AM. LAW. MEDIA, Sept. 4, 2001; Brooke A. Masters,
Battle Brewing Over 4th Circuit Nominees, WASH. POST, May 5,2001, atA6; Savage, supra
note 41.
80 See supra note 54. A similar lack ofconsultation with California's Democratic senators
seems to explain the decision not to nominate Christopher Cox or Carolyn Kuhl on May 9th.
See supra note 53; see also David G. Savage, Bush to Name L.A. Judge to 9th Circuit, L.A.
TIMES, June 22, 2001, at A12.
[Vol. 10O: 1
BUSH AND APPEALS COURT NOMINEES
Virginia's senators may have been reluctant to oppose the first African American
appointee to the appellate court which includes the largest percentage of African
American residents."' Maryland's senators correspondingly emphasized that Peter
Keisler was neither a member of the Maryland Bar nor practiced law there. 2
This process and the people nominated also confirm the rise and development
of certain newer conventions and norms. For instance, the group of nominees
evidence the federal judiciary's increasing "professionalization" in the sense that
persons selected possess prior judicial experience. 3 The package concomitantly
evinces the practice of elevation to the appellate bench from the state courts and
other federal judicial positions - primarily district, but also bankruptcy and
magistrate, judgeships. 4 The individuals nominated, and Bush's characterization
of their credentials, similarly suggest that those who receive nomination to the
appeals courts must satisfy a quite high standard of competence. These
qualifications include previous judicial service, Supreme Court or appellate
clerkships, and being a Supreme Court advocate. Moreover, the names submitted
indicate that a contemporary president's nominees must be diverse in terms of race
and gender and even political views, particularly when government is divided. 5
Furthermore, several factors attest to the important role of interest groups. These
include the apparent influence exerted on the nomination process by the Federalist
Society as well as affiliation with, or membership in, this organization of many on
the White House selection team and of some nominees. 6
The chief executive's remarks in announcing the eleven persons
correspondingly reveal modern constraints on the process. For example, his
comments indicate that presidents must be perceived as conciliatory, bipartisan,
moderate and willing to compromise. Bush's statements also show that recent chief
executives have developed a standard litany which they seem obligated to recite.
For instance, these presidents must champion a civil, dignified confirmation process
as well as fair hearings and final votes on all nominees for the good of the Senate,
the judiciary and the nation because partisan contentiousness erodes respect for
"! See Masters, supra note 79; Alison Mitchell, Senators Confirm 3 Judges, Including
Once-Stalled Black, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A16.
82 See, e.g., Greene & Healy, supra note 54; Masters, supra note 79.
83 See, e.g., Goldman et al., supra note 36, at 241; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 24,
at 259.
84 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. President Clinton elevated several
Republican appointees, including Judge Sonia Sotomayor and Judge Ann Claire Williams.
See Tobias, supra note 1, at 842, 846.
" See supra note 57 and accompanying text. See also Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial
Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998).
86 See supra note 42. Efforts to shape the debate by commenting on candidates before and
after nomination also evince the groups' influence. See, e.g., Jonathan Groner, Left Builds
Case Against Bush Judges, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REv., June 5, 2001, at 1; Richey, supra
note 70; Savage, supra note 41.
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participants and the process and because vacancies create backlogs and delay
justice. 7
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
This analysis suggests that the procedures employed by President Bush and his
aides in tendering the first eleven appeals court nominees and the candidates
submitted display much Bush Administration appreciation for contemporary
appellate selection. However, subsequent developments, especially the decision of
Senator James Jeffords (R-Vt.) to become an independent which accorded the
Democratic Party a Senate majority,88 have dramatically altered the dynamics of
judicial appointments. If the president wants to facilitate the selection process, he
should consider several possibilities.
One important concept will be bipartisanship. The chief executive's inclusion
of two Clinton appointees among the initial eleven nominees is illustrative. 9 Other
examples are agreements among leaders in specific states that Democrats may
recommend some district court candidates' and in Congress that the party might
propose a percentage of nominees." Closely related is the notion of compromise,
which the first package of nominees exemplified. For instance, the decision to omit,
or delay, nomination of candidates who might prove controversial, particularly by
engendering opposition from home-state senators, was advisable in May and could
prove even more important in the future. 2
Another practice that has traditionally expedited the judicial selection process
is consultation. For example, the chief executive indicated that he had secured
advice on individual candidates before their formal nomination from senators of
both political parties. 3 Bush should also seek similar future input from Senator
Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.), the Senate Majority Leader; Senator Patrick Leahy (D-
87 Reversed White House and Senate party control has led each to adopt the other's
former ideas; Republicans now urge prompt votes on, and Democrats urge full scrutiny of,
all nominees.
88 See, e.g., Groner, supra note 62; Jeffords' Switch Cramps Bush's Judiciary Plans,
TIM ES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 30, 2001, at 1.
89 They were Judges Gregory and Parker. See supra notes 43, 56, 81 and accompanying
text.
90 See Tony Batt, With Feeling and Fealty, Reid Counsel Helps Guide Judges Through
Senate, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 26, 2001, at IF; Carl Tobias, Judicial Choices: A
Bipartisan Way, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 12, 2001, at A23.
9' This idea might be informal or formal. For example, Congress could pass a judgeships
bill, which would authorize the 60 new judicial positions that the Judicial Conference has
recommended to Congress. See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the
U.S., 1999 OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 21-23. See also Tobias, supra note 1, at 853; Tobias,
supra note 32, at 749, 753.
92 See supra notes 53-54, 80 and accompanying text.
9' See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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Vt.) the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair; and individual senators, especially who
represent those areas in which judges will be stationed.
The president as well should continue and expand the practice of searching for,
identifying, and nominating the most highly competent individuals he can find. The
initial eleven nominees, who included five federal judges, two state Supreme Court
justices, and four former High Court clerks, demonstrated the type of qualifications
that candidates should possess. These characteristics, thus, encompass
industriousness, intelligence, independence, and balanced judicial temperament.
Certain propositions above suggest that the chief executive should reassess the
significance he attaches to nominees' ideological views. For instance, neither the
2000 presidential election results nor the Senate returns constituted a resounding
mandate for making the bench very conservative. Moreover, Democratic control
of the Senate will complicate efforts to name jurists with these perspectives. Bush,
therefore, might want to consider compromising somewhat on the political views
of the candidates he tenders, an idea that the first group of nominees may evince.
CONCLUSION
On May 9, President Bush submitted his initial package of nominees for the
federal appellate courts. Assessment of the practices applied and the eleven
individuals chosen reveals much about the Bush Administration's perspectives on
federal judicial selection and about contemporary appointments. If the chief
executive and his assistants who are responsible for choosing nominees adopt the
suggestions proffered, they should be able to facilitate the selection process.
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